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Abstract
Beyond point solutions, the vision of edge computing
is to enable web services to deploy their edge functions
in a multi-tenant infrastructure present at the edge of
mobile networks. However, edge functions can be ren-
dered useless because of one critical issue: Web services
are delivered over end-to-end encrypted connections, so
edge functions cannot operate on encrypted traffic without
compromising security or degrading performance. Any
solution to this problem must interoperate with existing
protocols like TLS, as well as with new emerging security
protocols for client and IoT devices. The edge functions
must remain invisible to client-side endpoints but may re-
quire explicit control from their service-side web services.
Finally, a solution must operate within overhead margins
which do not obviate the benefits of the edge.
To address this problem, this paper presents SPX– a
solution for edge-ready and end-to-end secure protocol
extensions, which can efficiently maintain end-to-edge-to-
end (E3) security semantics. Using our SPX prototype,
we allow edge functions to operate on encrypted traffic,
while ensuring that security semantics of secure protocols
still hold. SPX uses Intel SGX to bind the communi-
cation channel with remote attestation and to provide a
solution that not only defends against potential attacks but
also results in low performance overheads, and neither
mandates any changes on the end-user side nor breaks
interoperability with existing protocols.
1 Introduction
Edge computing promises to support low latency web
services by moving them fully or partially (i.e., as
application-specific edge functions [17]) to edge com-
puting infrastructure positioned comparatively closer to
the data sources. Edge computing infrastructure deployed
by mobile network operators [1, 10] has at least two or-
ders of magnitude higher degree of distribution compared
to existing CDNs and cloud datacenters1. The high degree
of distribution exponentially increases the attack surface,
making edge computing more vulnerable, and therefore,
less secure. To guarantee security properties like confi-
dentiality and integrity for their users, most web services
employ end-to-end encryption (70% over TLS [8]). More
recently, due to the high TLS overhead for certain use
cases like IoT [23] and messaging [11], newer secure
protocols are being used. To carry out any useful process-
ing, edge functions require access to end users’ encrypted
traffic in decrypted form, at the more vulnerable edge
infrastructure.
Summarizing, edge computing raises a pressing need
for a solution to securely operate on encrypted traffic, in a
manner that provides the performance benefits of the edge
in terms of low latency, is secure considering existing
security semantics and threat models, and is interoperable
with the new use cases and security protocols relevant at
the edge.
The existing approaches to making something like this
possible are designed for different operating scenarios
and assumed usage models, making them inadequate for
edge computing. For instance, edge computing applica-
tions are posed as the first point of contact for low-end
devices (e.g., in IoT deployments) with Internet-based
web services. They may employ different security pro-
tocols (other than TLS) among them. To be practically
deployable, it is critical for edge computing applications
and the solutions they adopt to be transparent to those
devices, and not to require device-side changes or active
participation. Existing techniques fail to address these
requirements, or introduce prohibitive performance or
security vulnerabilities, as summarized below.
One approach is to use advanced encryption schemes
such as homomorphic [24] or searchable [47] encryp-
tion, which allow edge functions to carry out some oper-
ations on encrypted data. However, the state-of-the-art
1100,000s of cellular base stations vs. 1000s of CDNs or 10s of
geo-distributed cloud [4, 20, 22].
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implementations of these techniques have very high per-
formance overheads that overshadow any latency benefit
gained from using edge computing, ruling out their use.
Another approach is to leverage recent solutions de-
signed for network middleboxes that split secure ses-
sions [30, 36] to inspect encrypted traffic. These solutions
have several shortcomings. The most severe is their sus-
ceptibility to Iago attacks [18] by a curious edge provider
employee or to zero-days vulnerabilities such as Heart-
bleed [14] at the edge infrastructure. Using a shielded ex-
ecution environment (SEE), such as Intel SGX [9, 35]), as
proposed in mbTLS [25] and SafeBricks [41], seems suffi-
cient to address this. However, while these can be applied
in principle, using them requires changes in end user de-
vices. mbTLS [25] claims interoperability with legacy de-
vices, however, it only considers TLS, leaving out a large
number of devices that may not use TLS but still need
to be served by edge computing [23]. SafeBricks [41]
proposes to use SEE and IPsec to ensure protection of
encrypted traffic for network functions (NFs) running in
the cloud. It assumes that IPsec capability is introduced in
all end user devices, something that depends on how soon
IPSec is integrated in those devices. Further, a tunnel
is needed between each client, edge and web service, if
we are to make session level end-to-end security guaran-
tees; this can be too heavy for edge computing use cases,
making it practically difficult to deploy. In summary, al-
though these approaches are technically apt to address the
issues, they may simply be too difficult to apply in edge
computing settings due to their different design goals.
Furthermore, any system or protocol that relies on an
SEE-based remote attestation [26, 51] to measure the
trustworthiness of edge functions and, thereafter, to grant
them access to encrypted traffic, can be compromised
using two type of well known attacks: the time-of-check-
to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) and the cuckoo attack [39]
(details in §4). The root cause of the problem is that the
communication with the SEE can be compromised us-
ing these attacks. To maintain the same level of security
requires a binding between the SEE and the communi-
cation channel. However, achieving that securely and
transparently is non-trivial, especially for arbitrary secu-
rity protocols.
SPX. To achieve that binding and address the abovemen-
tioned challenges, we present Secure Protocol Exten-
sions (SPX) – a framework for deriving from end-to-end
secure protocols their edge-ready and secure extensions.
With SPX, edge functions can operate on encrypted traffic
over any existing security protocol, in collaboration with
the web services that deploy them, and without violat-
ing the end-to-end security semantics of the end users’
secure channel with the web service. SPX uses hardware-
provided shielded execution environments (SEE) such
as Intel SGX and augments the communication among
end users and web services via edge functions with an
additional communication between the edge and the web
service at an appropriate step of the protocol. With SPX,
the web services can enable edge functions to access con-
tents of the encrypted traffic while preserving what we
refer to as End-to-Edge-to-End (E3) security semantics
(§5), equivalent to the same level of security as the origi-
nal client device–web service connection. SPX achieves
this without requiring any changes on the end users’ side.
We prototyped SPX for popular existing protocols: TLS
(§8), and protocols developed using the Noise protocol
framework [40] (§9) to demonstrate its feasibility. The
experimental results show that the SPX-based versions
of these protocols add only modest 12-15% latency over-
head. Considering that from end user devices the next
infrastructure tier (e.g., CDNs) has several factors longer
latencies than the edge [43], SPX retains the edge perfor-
mance benefits, despite these overheads.
In summary, this paper makes the following research
contributions.
• The notion of E3 security properties, central to enabling
edge computing, made practical through the secure
protocol extensions (SPX) approach.
• The SPX design framework for extending secure proto-
cols for the edge. SPX can be applied to any protocol.
Its design considers the limitations of SEEs such as
Intel SGX, namely limited memory, instantiations or
processing capabilities, and makes recommendations
for supporting vectored instructions in next generation
shielded execution environments to make them more
attractive for use in edge computing.
• Concrete SPX implementation for TLS and any proto-
col developed using the Noise protocol framework, and
evaluation of their performance impact on latency, the
core reason driving edge computing.
2 Motivation
We start with an example scenario to clarify the motiva-
tion for the development of SPX.
Motivating example scenario. Consider a company
like ADT security. It decides to deploy its edge function
that analyzes data from sensors deployed at customers’
homes to ensure timely detection of unusual activity, such
as house break-ins or fire breakouts, in a cost effective
manner. The benefit expected by ADT is improved level
of service, due to more timely incident detection, and
reduced operating costs, resulting from reduced backhaul
bandwidth usage relative to having to deliver all traffic
from the sensors to ADT’s backend server. Today, the
various sensors in a single home connect to an ADT hub
device, deployed at the home, which in turn interacts with
their cloud based web service using TLS or other end-
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to-end secure protocols. We posit that to lower the costs
of such services with the increasing number of sensors
and other IoT devices in the homes (e.g, smart switches,
appliances, etc.), and to make them more manageable
(e.g., in light of the recent incidents [12, 13] caused due
to vulnerabilities in devices such as routers, set top boxes,
etc.), these hubs will be replaced with edge functions
running on a third-party multi-tenant edge infrastructure,
such as what will be offered by mobile network opera-
tors [3, 7]. In that case, the individual sensors in homes
will have to use TLS, or another end-to-end secure proto-
col, to connect to the web service, and these connections
may be transparently routed to a nearby edge location, for
ADT to achieve the expected benefits. In this example, a
connection must be established between the sensors and
ADT’s backend server, while the edge function is able to
look at and operate on the encrypted traffic to analyze it.
However, when a sensor connects to an ADT edge
function, it is desired that the connection terminates with
the same security as if it were terminating at an ADT web
service. This is different from today’s scenario where
content delivery networks (acting in reverse) are used
to aggregate the traffic from hubs or devices. Today,
their secure connections are terminated at CDNs where
root certificates are installed and security guarantees rely
on the physical security of the CDN nodes via business
agreements and the TLS protocol, as shown in Figure 1.
In edge computing, this may not be acceptable due to
the huge attack surface. Further, not all sensors may be
capable of supporting TLS due to the additional RTTs,
the size of the certificates, and battery constraints [2].
From the example, we derive the following require-
ments for a practical solution for the edge:
• Support unmodified end user devices: It is critical to
not require changes in end user devices or the protocols
they use. At the same time, edge functions must be
enabled to securely operate on encrypted traffic while
maintaining security guarantees;
• Consider vulnerable infrastructure: With a huge attack
surface, the trustworthiness of the privileged software
at the edge is questionable especially in multi-tenant
settings, as highlighted by the NSA-linked Cisco mid-
dlebox zero day vulnerability [6] incident.
• Pose minimum performance overhead: A high perfor-
mance overhead for mechanisms to ensure confidential-
ity and integrity of encrypted user traffic can absolve
the latency benefits expected from the edge functions
However, these requirements do not appear to be ad-
dressed in leading industry security specifications.
Gaps in Industry Specifications. Leading industry
bodies [3, 5, 7] responsible for defining a secure edge
computing ecosystem have suggested directly putting the
private key material of the certificate into an SEE such as
SGX to provide the required security. However, this will
not suffice. First, a certificate “kind of” binds the DNS
name to a private key, and browsers/apps on end user
devices would only verify the DNS name if it matches
the name in the certificate, but the edge function may not
have the same DNS name. Second and more importantly,
although we trust SEE to provide isolation, it does not
guarantee the software running inside SEE is bug free.
This is also the main motivation for adding ASLR support
in Intel SGX. In case of vulnerability such as Heartbleed,
the private key could be leaked very easily. Moreover,
schemes based on time invalidation of certificates have
known vulnerabilities. Therefore, putting private key ma-
terial in the SEE is risky. Recent work on SEE-based
middleboxes aim to address a similar problem, but by
focusing on datacenter-centric assumptions and design
constrains, these efforts remain open to certain types of
vulnerabilities [41], are limited to certain types of de-
vices and protocols [25], or their impact on the latency
overheads is not discussed (see §11).
3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about operating sce-
narios. First, we assume that backend services are willing
to deploy edge functions on open multi-tenant edge infras-
tructure. Edge functions handle end-user requests over
secure protocols to provide benefits in terms of reduced
latency and bandwidth usage. Second, we assume that
when a client tries to access a web service, the connection
is transparently directed to an edge function of the web
service. The redirection can be DNS-based or S1-based,
in enterprise and the mobile edge, respectively, or some
application level redirection. The mechanism used for
redirection is orthogonal to the design of SPX and we
assume that all relevant packets in a flow are redirected
to an SPX-enabled edge function. Third, we assume
that security guarantees provided by existing protocols in
end-to-end communication, such as TLS or Noise-based
protocols, still hold.
Finally, we assume availability of an OS shielded exe-
cution environment (SEE) whose trust can be established
via remote attestation. However, we do not make any
assumptions around the performance of the available SEE.
Designing an SEE-based solutions has inherent perfor-
mance overhead due to memory encryption, limited or no
I/O access in trusted mode, limited addressable memory,
and limited number of concurrent SEE executions. In
addition, compared to a canonical threading model (e.g.,
pthreads), multithreading within an enclave is not triv-
ial [9, 35]. Some of these limitations are addressed in the
newer architectures, but the fact remains that a shielded ex-
ecution in an enclave is and will remain a scarce resource
on processors. This is important because it obviates some
of the trivial solutions. For example, allowing every edge
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function to keep a secure channel with the corresponding
web service open at all times, and subsequently, to use
that channel to get session keys for all clients, say based
on a unique nonce of the session, has two short comings:
First, it could lead to highly inefficient use and wastage
of SEE resources, and second, it still does not suffice for
end-to-end security semantics.
4 Threat Model
Different from a traditional network threat model, where
an adversary usually is in the middle as an observer and
launches attacks only over the traffic on a secure channel,
we consider a stronger threat model where an adversary
has full control over the edge infrastructure, including
the operating system, except for the shielded execution
environment (SEE). The adversary can freely monitor,
intercept, and forward the data over the communication
channel between the OS and SEE. For example, if an edge
function running in an SEE tries to open a channel to the
OS in order to talk to remote clients, the adversary who
controls the OS also has the full control over that channel.
The rationale behind considering such a threat model is
derived from the following observations:
• Edge computing is a multi-stakeholder and multi-tenant
environment with different ownership domains, i.e.,
mobile network operators’ edge infrastructure, web
services’s edge functions, and end users’ data.
• The adversary can be a curious edge infrastructure
provider (insider) or a malicious edge function exploit-
ing a zero-day vulnerability to gain root access. With
that, it can potentially compromise all edge functions
and potentially open a back door to the cloud-based
web service.
• Finally, the edge infrastructure is typically deployed
in physically insecure locations (cellular towers, ag-
gregation points, edge servers, etc.) creating a huge
attack surface of edge computing, and protecting it
from advanced persistent threats like zero-days, mali-
cious insiders, etc., mandates stronger threat models.
The above observations around edge computing imply
that it warrants stricter security and lead us to consider the
stronger threat model. We argue that the existing solutions
that consider a weaker threat model are not applicable in
edge computing scenarios due to their target use cases
or operating assumptions. The attacks discussed above
could lead to a situation where a malicious edge function
has privileged access and can mount Iago attacks [18],
and warrant an SEE-based solution.
Furthermore, most of the existing solutions fail to ade-
quately address the lack of binding between communica-
tion channel and the SEE when using remote attestation.
If a communication channel is not carefully bound, two
general types of attacks are possible:
TOCTTOU attack: A communication channel is vul-
nerable to a TOCTTOU attack if the attestation is per-
formed before establishing the communication channel.
Consider the following scenario: A web service initial-
izes a remote attestation request to measure the target
edge function. Next, the malicious edge function with
root privileges routes this request to the intended benign
edge function. The benign edge function responds with
an expected measurement and the web service initializes
another encrypted communication channel to an edge
function. The malicious edge function routes the new
communication to itself instead.
Cuckoo attack: A communication channel is vulnera-
ble to a cuckoo attack if the attestation is performed after
establishing the communication channel. When a web ser-
vice initializes an encrypted channel to an edge function,
the malicious edge function routes the communication
to itself. The web service initializes a remote attesta-
tion request over the established channel. A malicious
edge function then forwards the attestation request to the
correct edge function which responds with a correct mea-
surement to the malicious edge function. The malicious
edge function then forwards the correct measurement to
the web service.
These attacks are possible for two reasons. First, the
malicious edge function has full control of its internal
network, so it can arbitrarily route network packets to
whichever edge function it wants. Second, because there
exists a lack of a trusted channel to deliver the certifi-
cate, the end-to-end protocol cannot distinguish among
malicious and benign edge functions, potentially leak-
ing sensitive key material. However, if we just use a
short lived Diffie-Hellman (DH) key bound to the SEE
attestation, even if the edge function is compromised,
the consequence is much less severe. However, the SEE
performance overhead in doing that has to be within ac-
ceptable limits to make it suitable for edge computing.
Under the threat model, we assume that the adversary
cannot mount any attack directly on the SEE. We assume
the SEE is under a strong protection against all external
software accesses. We do not consider denial of service
attacks of edge functions that can be mounted by the priv-
ileged software at edge infrastructure. This is reasonable
because devices can simply fallback to interacting with
the web service directly in case edge functions are under
a denial of service attack. We also do not consider side
channel attacks on SEE.
5 SPX Overview
The primary goal of any end-to-end protocol like TLS or
the Noise-based protocols is to provide privacy and data
integrity between two communicating applications. These
applications are assumed to be running on two ends, i.e.,
4
end user 
(client)
web service 
(server, CDN)
client
edge infrastructure
end-to-end security 
via protocols (TLS)
E3 security via 
TLS + SPX
SPX 
edge function 
SPX 
Server, CDN
No changes
TLS
edge 
function 
S1 or IP 
based
redirection
Certs
Certs
Today
With Edge Computing
Figure 1: Comparing interaction between end users (client) and
web services (server) that operate on assumption of end-to-end
security using protocols like TLS vs. the interaction between
end users client, edge functions and web services which violates
assumptions in the protocols rendering security provided by
them undefined. With SPX we define it as E3 security.
client and server. However, in case of edge computing, it
is desired that the edge, which is in the middle of the client
and server, is afforded access to their communication so
as to complete performance-enhancing functions.
SPX enables creation of a secure communication chan-
nel between the end user (client) and the edge function
transparently, with the same end-to-end security seman-
tics as when the client directly opens a secure channel
with the web service (server), as shown in Figure 1. This
is needed to enable edge functions to perform useful
application-specific processing, beyond just network-level
functions. If edge functions cannot access the encrypted
data in the messages from a client to a server, edge com-
puting is only of limited use.
In principle, it can be argued that terminating connec-
tion at an edge function is still end-to-end secure by sim-
ply splitting TLS. However, it should be noted that in
that interaction, one end has moved from the web ser-
vice to the edge function. This termination of the secure
session at a potentially insecure edge function is not the
same. Thereby, we argue that it does not have same se-
curity semantics as terminating it at secure server. We
propose SPX with E3 security semantics as a key enabler
in edge computing without compromising the security or
usefulness of edge functions.
Concretely, we consider SPX to be satisfying E3 se-
mantics for a given protocol if and only if SPX preserves
the end-to-end security semantics for encrypted network
traffic transmitted using that protocol, i.e., it preserves
confidentiality, data integrity and authentication between
client and server, from every other entity in the system (in-
cluding any privileged software on the edge infrastructure
such as OS or hypervisor), except for the edge function.
This is achieved in two steps. First, SPX utilizes SEE
to perform the encryption so a malicious edge function
(even with root access) can only see the encrypted net-
work traffic. Second, SPX utilizes an attestation-bound
handshake protocol to transfer the session key of the sup-
ported protocol from the server to the edge at an appropri-
ate point in the protocol. As a result, when establishing
the secure channel, the client still authenticates using the
server’s credentials (not deployed at edge functions). In
other words, the edge function is transparent, e.g., during
a handshake, the client will see and authenticate the edge
function using the server’s certificate instead of the edge
provider’s certificate. Moreover, the authentication key
of the SPX-enabled secure protocols (e.g., the private
key of the server’s certificate) never leaves the server so
the risk of identity theft is lowered and is the same as in
today’s cloud-based web services. Finally, by binding the
key exchange between the edge function and the server
with an SEE-based attestation, SPX is resistant to the
two kinds of attacks discussed earlier in §4. Achieving
this however requires different design considerations than
typical security protocols, discussed next.
6 SPX Design Considerations
The design considerations for SPX critical for achieving
E3 security semantics and retaining edge-based perfor-
mance can be described as follows:
Ensuring security semantics. To preserve security se-
mantics, the following key elements must be considered:
Channel binding: The key to prevent the TOCTTOU
and cuckoo attacks (and other attacks as well) at the edge
is to bind an attestation with the corresponding commu-
nication channel. In SPX, this is done by including the
ephemeral public key in the attestation so the server can
verify at the same time (1) that the edge function is in-
deed running inside an SEE, (2) the integrity of the edge
function, and (3) that the ephemeral key pair is indeed
generated inside the SEE so no other entity has access to
it.
Channel relaying: After successful binding, the next
important step is when the server shares the session state
and session key with edge function, before communicat-
ing the completion of the secure connection establishment
to the client. This allows an SPX-enabled edge function
to relay the same communication channel used for its own
handshake to the clients. This is important (i) to ensure
that the attested connection is relayed to the client, hence,
establishing its security properties, and (ii) requiring ad-
ditional connections is undesirable from the perspective
of the edge function and server resource usage.
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Preserving performance. As noted earlier, latency per-
formance is a key benefit of edge computing, and any
security solution for the edge must preserve this benefit.
Below are more performance oriented design elements
that must be considered.
Piggybacking. SPX messages are piggybacked with
existing protocol messages as much as possible. SPX pig-
gybacked markers trigger SPX operationsat the edge func-
tions or server. By doing this, SPX minimizes the need for
extra interactions between the edge and the server, which
reduces the possibility of man-in-the-middle (MITM) at-
tacks. This also to maintains at minimum the overhead
on the edge and server side, and keeps the client side
engaged to avoid timeouts in existing protocols.
Protocol replication. Wherever possible, SPX running
in the edge function replicates the protocol’s abstract state
at the edge, instead of having the edge function maintain
all state variables and compute all crypto functions, which
can be resource intensive. Replicating state allows SPX-
enabled edge functions to keep track of the protocol state
and carry out operations like requesting the session key
at the right time during a handshake via remote attesta-
tion, so as to ensure that even without actually carrying
out crypto functions, the channel binding remains secure.
This allows SPX to keep the computational overhead as-
sociated with carrying out those functions at the edge in
check.
Addressing limitations of SEE hardware. It is impor-
tant to consider the limitation of the SEE hardware. For
instance, (i) the 6th generation Intel processors have only
128 MB of memory addressable to all the running en-
claves, (ii) the number of enclave instantiations running
simultaneously is limited, and (iii) running an SGX thread
consumes one of the logical CPUs and makes it unavail-
able to other threads. Although these are soft limitations
that are further relaxed in current and future processor
generation, a practical SPX solution should not be bound
by them. To address this, (i) SPX uses a spilling mech-
anism, i.e., the session look up table spills over to host
memory if the enclave does not have enough memory.
However, to ensure E3 guarantees, SPX uses the SEE
sealing feature to store session information. To guarantee
the confidentiality and integrity of the sealed information,
sealing encrypts the information using the hardware gener-
ated sealing key. By doing this, with a small performance
penalty, SPX-enabled edge functions are only limited
by the amount of host memory as opposed to memory
addressable by the SEE. To mitigate the impact of (ii)
SPX enabled edge functions require only one enclave
instantiation per edge function as opposed to one enclave
instantiation per session. However, SPX cannot share
enclaves with two different edge functions without com-
promising E3 guarantees, because in that case two edge
functions can generate the same ephemeral key and the
same attestation reports. To mitigate the impact of (iii),
we need to make sure that the time required in binding is
kept to a minimum so that the edge function waiting for
attestation response, including session keys, finishes as
quickly as possible. This is accomplished by monitoring
the state of the handshake.
To ensure that these considerations are always met, we
defined a set of key operations common to arbitrary secure
protocols, discussed next.
7 Designing a Generic SPX
The following key operations are needed to design an
SPX for an arbitrary secure protocol.
Detect (D): An SPX-enabled edge function must be
able to detect the client’s session initiation message which
is usually transferred in plain text.
Relay (R): Once the edge function detects an initializa-
tion of an SPX-enabled protocol, it relays the initializa-
tion message to the server and behaves like a transparent
proxy until the session is established. It is important that
the edge function monitors the entire handshake process
so as to extract relevant protocol state (e.g., encryption
suite) that is necessary to talk to the client.
Bind (B): Piggybacking with the relayed traffic, the
edge function sends an additional message that binds the
attestation with an ephemeral public key to the server. The
ephemeral key pair is generated inside the enclave and
will be deleted after the handshake completes. This is the
step where the two aforementioned attacks are prevented.
Forward (F): To maintain transparency, the edge func-
tion must not communicate any SPX-related information
in the protocol messages exchanged with clients. The
extra steps in the protocol must be handled at the edge
so that clients receive the same information as if they
were setting up a direct connection with the web service.
This function is important to address interoperability and
deployment concerns with SPX.
Grant (G): When the server finishes the session es-
tablishment and the authentication of the edge function
is successful (by verifying the attestation report), the
server transfers the session key, which is encrypted by
the ephemeral public key contained in the attestation, to
the edge function through the key exchange channel. On
receiving the session key message, an edge function de-
crypts the key using the corresponding ephemeral private
key, registers the session, and begins serving the client’s
request thereafter.
Resume (S): SPX may optionally also keep state for the
session if a protocol supports resume or zero-RTT session
setup, e.g., TLS1.3 or Noise protocols with pre-shared
keys in IoT devices.
Next, we describe how we applied the above framework
to develop SPX for TLS and Noise-based protocols.
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Figure 2: Showing the SPX enabled TLS: TLX handshake
protocol.
8 Design of TLX = TLS + SPX
TLS/SSL [50] has two types of subprotocols: the hand-
shake protocol and the record protocol. The handshake
protocol is for negotiating security parameters for the
record protocol, authenticating two peers, reporting er-
rors, etc. It is also the key step to prevent MITM attacks.
In particular, by using public key encryption, TLS guaran-
tees that only the two communication peers have access
to the randomly generated session key that is used in the
record protocol. In TLX, we utilize SPX to securely trans-
fer this secret key from the server to the edge function
without trusting the edge provider. Figure 2 shows the
TLX protocol with SPX operations marked with same
letters as defined in §7 and is described below:
A TLX enabled edge function detects a ClientHello
and SPX adds a request as a TLS extension in the
ClientHello message which is then forwarded to the
server. Having received the request, the server responds
by including a response in its ServerHello message,
again, as a TLS extension. The response can be OK or
Not Capable. An OK message is followed by a challenge
(nonce), to guarantee the freshness of the attestation and
to prevent replay attacks, and a signed ephemeral pub-
lic key (similar to the ServerKeyExchange message), to
establish the key exchange channel. Having received
the response from the server, SPX strips the server re-
sponse from the ServerHello message and relays the rest
of the messages to the client. SPX validates the certificate,
checks whether it is from the trusted server (similar to
public key pinning [21]), and verifies the ephemeral key is
signed by the public key which corresponds to the certifi-
cate to prevent MITM attacks [31]. While waiting for the
client to respond, SPX generates a fresh pair of ephemeral
keys and generates an attestation that includes both the
public key and the challenge (nonce). Then it sends the
attestation and the public key to the server together with
the client response. Having received the attestation, the
server verifies its freshness, correctness, as well as the
legitimacy of the public key. Once every check clears,
the server then sends the session key to the edge func-
tion encrypted with the exchanged ephemeral key, as well
as ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages. Note that
for transparency, all SPX-related messages will not be in-
cluded when calculating the hash of handshake messages.
SPX strips and decrypts the session key and forwards the
rest of the messages to the client. From now on, the edge
function can securely communicate with the client using
the TLS record protocol with agreed cipher spec.
The handshake is aborted if either the normal TLS
handshake fails or an attestation-related error occurs.
9 Design of NoiXe = Noise + SPX
Noise Background: Noise [40] is a framework for crypto
protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement. A
Noise handshake is described by a simple language con-
sisting of tokens arranged into message patterns. Message
patterns are arranged into handshake patterns. A hand-
shake pattern specifies the sequential exchange of mes-
sages between an initiator (client) and responder (server),
and the corresponding crypto state transitions that com-
prise a handshake. A handshake pattern can be instanti-
ated by crypto functions (DH functions, cipher functions,
and a hash function) to give a concrete Noise protocol. A
Noise protocol starts with prologue data and some pat-
terns require pre-messages to be exchanged between the
parties. Messages include e: ephemeral key, s: static
key, and dhee, dhse, dhes, dhss: the sender per-
forms a DH between the corresponding local state, remote
state and computes the required hashes. Readers are di-
rected to the Noise specification for further details about
the protocol framework [40].
Applications can choose to specify and use their own
defined protocol between their end users and the web ser-
vice. NoiXe allows edge functions to support any secure
protocol that can be built using the Noise protocol frame-
work. A Noise protocol starts with prologue exchanged
between a server and client. For example, suppose a
server communicates a list of Noise protocols that it sup-
ports to clients. Applications on the client side will then
7
Initiator Handler Responder
Prologue
DPrologue,
SPX Attest ext.
D Prologue,
SPX Attestion ext., ephemeral key
FPrologue
Server
Re
R
e, dhee, s, dhse
BSPX
Attestation
report
s, dhse
R
e, dhee, s, dhse
e, dhse
G session key
Figure 3: Showing the Noise_XX pattern handshake with SPX
enabled Noise framework.
choose among them and execute that protocol to commu-
nicate with the server. SPX uses the prologue to perform
the detect operation on the edge and server side. When a
client tries to connect to a server using a Noise protocol, it
is directed to a NoiXe-enabled edge function. The NoiXe
edge function leverages the hand shake pattern informa-
tion of the protocol being used to choose the appropriate
messages to carry out its other functions. First, it creates
a secure channel with the server using the same proto-
col as requested by the client. Then, the edge function
and the server carry out the bind operation, i.e., use the
channel to send and receive an attestation report created
in a secure enclave using the ephemeral key shared and
verified using certificates. On successful mutual attes-
tation, a NoiXe enabled edge function relays the same
channel to the client, while acting as a Noise proxy for it
to carry out its handshake with the server. This ensures
that security expectations of the clients are honored and
the channel that was bound is the one that is getting used
for the client-server communication.
On the edge function side, after a detect operation, the
edge function capable of the equivalent NoiXe protocol
initializes a handshake state object for that protocol and
keeps it up to date with the state on the server, while act-
ing as a forwarding proxy for communication between the
web service and the client. Since Noise uses symmetrical
encryption, there is no need to replicate the execution of
the protocol on the edge function side. Instead, it selects
the appropriate messages from the protocol’s handshake
message pattern (part of the Noise handshake state) to
obtain the required information from the server, e.g., cur-
rent hash state. Finally, the session keys are granted by
the server to the edge function before the last message
is exchanged between the server and client as part of
another attestation report to prevent eavesdropping or im-
personation. In the cases where the last message in the
handshake pattern is from the client side, the server grants
the session keys after it finishes the crypto function. The
handshake is only carried out whenever an attestation re-
quest can be satisfied (indicated by attestation extension).
The handshake is aborted if a requested attestation is not
received or is invalid, or the Noise session information
does not match the signature in the attestation.
Figure 3 shows the handshake patterns for Noise_XX
between an initiator (client) and responder (server), along
with the SPX operations marked with same letters as
defined in §7. Noise_XX is used to start a compound
protocol called Noise pipe [11]. Noise pipes do not as-
sume any previous communication between a client and
server. The Noise_XX handshake pattern supports mutual
authentication and transmission of static public keys that
are stored and used as pre-messages in the next Noise_IK
pattern to create the session. Important to note is that
binding happens only after the DH function is performed.
Identifying this step requires knowledge about the pro-
tocol. NoiXe achieves this by the replicated state and
performing the attestation after first DH operation is per-
formed, thus preserving the protocol handshake pattern
as well as avoiding MITM attacks. Other protocols are
supported in similar manner.
10 Implementation
We implemented SPX prototypes for Ubuntu 14.04 using
the Intel SGX Linux SDK. We highlight interesting im-
plementation details for TLS and Noise protocols below.
TLX. We prototyped TLX by modifying the TLS im-
plementation on top of the mbedTLS libraries. We lever-
aged the extension feature introduced in TLS 1.2 to in-
tegrate attestation request and verification into the hand-
shake. We then ported the modified library into an enclave
to support SPX functionality.
NoiXe. We modified the Noise protocol framework to
support a new role of ‘handler’ to create an intelligent
Noise edge function that allows replication of the crypto
state of the Noise protocols. To run a Noise protocols in
an SGX enclave, we ported the full Noise protocol frame-
work to run inside an enclave, including all its crypto
functions. Using it, we implemented a proxy that runs
as the edge function and a server that uses the SPX en-
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abled Noise framework - NoiXe. We had to disable use
of vectorization in blake2 and ChaChaPoly because SSE2
optimizations are not supported in an SGX enclave with
6th generation Intel processors.
Remote Attestation for Enclave. Remote attestation
in Intel SGX is designed to use trusted servers, i.e., In-
tel servers or other parties that are granted the processor
secret keys under suitable agreements, to verify the attes-
tation measurements. However, in our implementation,
we bypassed the use of those servers to simplify our im-
plementation. This does not lead to any loss of generality
of our prototype or evaluations because we posit that par-
ties deploying edge functions would act as those trusted
entities as per Intel.
11 Evaluation
An SPX enabled protocol preserves E3 semantics while
allowing edge function full access to the web traffic, with
affordable impact on perceived latencies. The evaluations
demonstrate that the design and implementation of SPX
achieve this goal.
11.1 Security Analysis
E3 security semantics ∼= end-to-end security. Using
SPX, an edge function gains access to the encrypted traf-
fic but only within a secure SEE enclave. With hardware
provided protection, it remains secure from any other soft-
ware component in the system and any communication
from outside the SEE is secured by the protocol, same as
in the default two-party case. In that sense, we claim that
E3 security semantics is equivalent to the conventional
end-to-end security afforded by encryption using a secure
protocol.
Preserved security properties of protocols. SPX en-
sures that the security properties of the original protocol
for which it is developed remain preserved. For instance,
for TLX, it ensures that the connection between client-
edge-server remains same as a client-server connection.
First, the identities of all parties can be authenticated,
thanks to the bind step between the edge and server, while
the client-server are authenticated using the TLS record
protocol. Second, the channel attested is the channel that
gets used by the edge function to interact with the client,
thanks to the relay step. Finally, the grant before the
handshake finishes, from within the SEE, ensures that
the shared (negotiated) secret remains secure from any
other software entity, including privileged software at the
edge, ensuring the reliability of the handshake. Similar
discussion is valid for any of the Noise-based protocols
and their corresponding properties. By preserving secu-
rity properties, a SPX enabled edge remains secure from
attacks that those protocols protect against, including lago
attacks based on introspection of memory used by appli-
cations using these protocols. However, these protocols
are not designed to protect against lago attacks that may
use impersonation as they assume end points to be secure.
Protection from impersonation by privileged attack-
ers. SPX prevents lago attacks such as the cuckoo and
TOCTTOU attacks by using ephemeral keys during the
bind phase and ensuring that the grant is done before the
handshake negotiation finishes. By doing this it ensures
that no two sessions have the same ephemeral key and a
malicious attacker cannot wait for the end of the protocol
and try to get access to the shared private key. Further,
the sharing remains within the SEE and is never exposed
outside of it. These, combined, prevent any privileged
attacker from impersonating as a web service to an edge
function, or vice versa, to gain access to the session key.
Comparison with relevant alternatives. In comparison
to recent proposals with similar goals, the SPX approach
differs in the following ways. SafeBricks proposes to
use Intel SGX and controlled development of NFs to pro-
tect them against Iago attacks [18] when deployed in the
cloud. It relies on IPsec isolation for protection of the
traffic. Use of IPsec can be unreasonable in the target use
cases for edge computing. For use cases such as IoT data
aggregation, and caches for arbitrary clients, end devices
may not support IPsec. Further, it remains susceptible to
the TOCTTOU and cuckoo attacks as it exchanges secrets
after the connection between the client and NF with SEE
is established. mbTLS proposes to modify TLS in a simi-
lar way as proposed by SPX, but is limited to TLS itself.
Although, sufficient for use in edge computing with TLS,
it cannot be applied if some other protocol is used. In
comparison, SPX achieves E3 security semantics for ex-
isting protocols while remaining completely transparent
to end user devices making it well suited for edge com-
puting. However, SPX does have impact on performance
of those protocols, which we present next.
11.2 Performance
SPX ensures that edge functions remain transparent for
clients, which is critical in edge computing for practical
deployability. In this section, we evaluate the perfor-
mance overhead incurred to carry out the additional steps
proposed by SPX.
Experimental Setup. Table 1 lists the experimental
setup used in the experiments. We used machines with
6th generation Intel processors with SGX support for the
edge functions and web services. We implemented a TCP
client, proxy (edge function), and server, which commu-
nicate using TLS (mbedTLS library) and Noise protocols
using a standard framework as our baselines. Then, we
added SPX capability to the edge and server side, i.e.,
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Setup Configuration
Client Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-1620 v2 @ 3.70GHz, 16GB
DIMM DDR3 Synchronous RAM, Intel Ethernet Con-
nection (2) I219-V
Edge Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz, 16GB
DIMM DDR3 Synchronous RAM, 128 MB configured
for SGX, Intel Ethernet Connection (2) I219-V
Server Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40GHz, 16GB
DIMM DDR3 Synchronous RAM, 128 MB configured
for SGX, Intel Ethernet Connection (2) I219-V
Network LAN over 512 Mbps connection. RTT (ms) Client-
Proxy: 0.964, Proxy-Server: 0.901, Client-Server:
0.962
Table 1: Experimental setup.
implemented the portion that handles the encryption state
(proxy and server both) to run in an SGX enclave, and
used TLX (modified mbedTLS library) and NoiXe (mod-
ified Noise framework libraries). We used 128 bit AES
encryption in RSA for TLS with a certificate size 3KB,
and ChaChaPoly cipher, 256 SHA2, and 56 bit curve488
key for the Noise based protocols. In both cases, we used
a 512 byte attestation report generated by the processor
inside an SGX enclave. We used an echo protocol over
a TCP socket connection to carry out our experiments.
We intentionally used very fast network between the com-
ponents to be able to accurately highlight the overhead
associated with SPX especially free of the network delays
which may amortize the effect of some of the overhead.
In that sense, the experimental setup demonstrates clearly
the performance impact on latency due to SPX given that
impact of the RTTs remains constant.
Workload & Measurements. We use application ker-
nels that are representative of common processing steps
in edge functions as our workload. Further, our measure-
ments are focussed on latency, i.e., the time as seen from
unmodified clients which is different than earlier work
which primarily focussed on throughput due to their target
use cases [25]. We also report the CPU overhead of SPX
on the edge computing infrastructure, which is important
to highlight given that resources at edge infrastructure
may be limited compared to well provisioned cloud or
semi-fixed function middleboxes.
File transfer. File transfer is representative of multiple
use cases such as content caching or IoT sensor data ag-
gregation. Each point in the Figure 4(a) and Figure 5 can
be used to characterize a different class of edge functions.
For instance, on the lower end 1K file size transfer can be
mapped to IoT sensor values where as 1.6 MB file transfer
can be thought of as video streaming.
Figure 4(a) and Figure 5 compare the time taken to
transfer files of different sizes. We compare SPX with
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Figure 4: (a) Showing time measured on client side in file
transfer using TLX (SPX enabled TLS) over TCP. (b) Showing
CDF of loading time for locally replayed web page load times
for Alexa’s top 100 web pages over TLX.
two baselines corresponding to a direct client-server case
without any edge processing (E2E), and a second one
corresponding to Split TLS [30]. The other solutions
mentioned in §11.1 are not publicly available so we could
not include them in the direct performance measurements.
The experimental results shown are averaged over 20
runs along with one standard deviation. SPX incurs mod-
est overhead of 12-15% over the insecure Split proxy
baseline. This can be attributed to execution inside an
SGX enclave, partly due to inherent SGX overhead, and
partly due to the copying of encrypted network packets
from host to enclave. The overhead is consistent with
the reported results in other solutions for introspection of
encrypted traffic in middleboxes [25, 41]. In addition, the
SPX approach also does not mandate apriori knowledge
of what to look for in the encrypted traffic, compared to
earlier approaches limited in functionality or with high
performance overhead, such as [36, 47]. The higher stan-
dard deviation in TLS vs. Noise is due to the packet size
used in experiments. TLS experiments used blocks of
1KB for the full file transfer where as Noise mandates the
use of messages to be less than or equal to 65535 bytes by
design for simplicity in testing, reducing the likelihood of
memory handling or integer overflow related issues and
efficient implementation of stream ciphers.
Web page loading. To understand how SPX would per-
form in realistic settings where the communication may
be over multiple connections and not always of the same
size objects, we mimicked the web page loading process
with SPX. We recorded and replayed Alexa’s top 100
websites using the Mahimahi tool [37] via a SPX-enable
proxy. Figure 4(b) shows the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the replayed webpage load times with
proxy only and with SPX-enabled proxy. Evident from
the graph is that there is modest overhead from SPX in
full web page loading. We attribute this to the structure
of the web pages which include a large number of small
objects, where the overhead of SPX is not amortized.
However, it is important to consider the fact the we are lo-
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Figure 5: Showing time measured on client side in file transfer
using different handshake patterns provided by NoiXE (SPX
enabled Noise framework) using echo protocol over TCP.
cally replaying web pages over a very fast networks. The
web page loading, which is usually in order of seconds
finishes in tens of milliseconds, thus presenting the worst
case for TLX. This is also evident on the right side in the
figure: as the time to load increases, the performance gap
diminishes.
Handshake. Figure 6 shows the time taken to carry
out handshakes when a client connects to a server with-
out any proxy (E2E), with a Split connection proxy, and
finally, via an SPX-enabled proxy and server for TLS
(Figure 6(a)) and 5 interactive handshake patterns (Fig-
ure 6(b)). Readers are directed to the Noise specifica-
tions [40] for details about the handshake patterns in
Noise and its description terminology. The results shown
are averaged over 20 runs to show one standard devia-
tion. We observed an overhead of only 12%-15% over the
baseline corresponding to the Split approach, which is the
only available approach to enable edge functionality.
Extra bytes and RTTs on wire during handshake. In
SPX, extra messages are exchanged between the edge
and server during setup of up a secure connection. For
TLS we only add one extra message between edge
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Figure 6: Comparing the handshake time of SPX enabled pro-
tocols (TLX, NoiXe) as observed on client side.
Protocol Extra bytes Extra RTTs
TLX 1152 1
NoiXe 1090 1 or 2
Table 2: Overhead due to SPX in terms of extra bytes and RTTs.
and server corresponding to 1 extra RTT and for noise
based protocols extra RTTs are 1 or 2 depending on
whether the last message is from server or client respec-
tively. The number of extra bytes exchanged between the
edge and server due to SPX-enabled edge functions is
2 ∗ Sizeattestation−report + Sizesession−key also listed in Ta-
ble 2. This demonstrates that the overhead of SPX in
terms of extra bytes is reasonable, it is dependent on the
protocol itself, and SPX is suitable for short-or long-lived
connections.
Due to space limitations, and the current prevalence
of TLS, we only show results for TLS for the remaining
benchmarks. However, we report that we observed similar
trends for the Noise protocols as well.
Scalability with concurrent connections. Figure 7(a)
shows the handshake time measured on the client side
for diffrent number of concurrent connections. Evident
from the figure is that the performance of SPX is not con-
strained by the number of concurrent connections. This
is important for SPX to be a solution in edge computing
scenarios because the edge infrastructure is by definition
resource constraint. Further, it also highlights another
point: with SPX, edge functions can securely service
multiple clients without being limited by the amount of
memory addressable by SGX enclaves.
Scalability of edge functions. We report that SPX puts
substantial overhead of nearly ~2x in terms of CPU time
during its operation. This has not been reported in earlier
works that utilize SEE to develop introspection solutions
for middleboxes. The consumption is due to memory
copy of network packets from host to enclave and over-
head due to memory page encryption and lack of vector
instructions for cryptographic operations. This is substan-
tial on its own. However, compared to BlindBox [47],
which uses much more CPU-intensive searchable encryp-
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Figure 7: (a) Showing variation of time measured in file transfer
using TLX with number of concurrent connections (b) Compar-
ing CPU time spent on proxy side measured file transfer using
concurrent.
tion while supporting only reduced functionality at the
middleboxes with similar security guarantees, SPX pro-
vides full access to encrypted traffic with comparatively
lower overheads. It may not be suitable for middleboxes
which are simply preprovisioned boxes, but is especially
important for edge computing, because this implies that
developers have full flexibility to implement any logic for
their edge functions and required compute capacity can
be provisioned accordingly.
12 Related Work
In addition to the solutions discussed in the earlier sec-
tions [24, 25, 30, 36, 41, 47], SPX builds on other prior
work related to secure execution environments.
Edge function security. Although several surveys [28,
44, 46, 48] have pointed out security and privacy chal-
lenges for edge functions, they do not handle cases of
compromised operating systems but instead, focus on
securing an execution environment. In an attempt to ad-
dress the handling of encrypted traffic in edge services,
one study [17] proposed Airbox, which is based on Intel
SGX. Airbox, however, is not protocol-centric, nor does
it address the limitations of the SEE hardware or prevent
cuckoo or TOCTTU attacks. SPX fills this gap.
Secure communication channel. Assuming a similar
threat model in which a host is untrusted, some studies
have focused on building a secure communication channel
on the same machine. Zhou et al. [54] outline an approach
to secure the data-transfer between a user’s I/O device and
a program trusted by the user. Jang et al. [29] propose Se-
CReT, a framework for building a secure channel between
SEE and non-SEE. Unlike the approaches in these stud-
ies, SPX targets the establishment of secure end-to-end
channel. EndBox proposes to run middlebox functions
on client side using Intel SGX by leveraging VPN con-
nections between clients and enterprise VPS servers. The
approach is not applicable in edge computing as the edge
functions run on edge infrastructure and may not be suit-
able to run on individual client devices. A simple example
is a web caching edge function which is already prevalent
in client browsers, but using caching across clients has its
own set of security issues. Further, from a performance
perspective, they may not offer acceptable performance
which is the core reason to deploy edge functions.
Use of SEE-based remote attestation. Several systems
built on top of shielded execution environments [15, 16,
19, 27, 38, 42, 45, 49, 52, 53] focus on providing a secure
execution environment. However, they do not provide
for establishing the trustworthiness of the communication
channels with such primitives, which is an inseparable
and critical part of edge computing. Several studies [32–
34] have used remote attestation to provide a remote party
trustworthiness of the local TCB. Haven [16] leverages
Intel SGX to prevent code and data from tampering by an
untrusted cloud provider. Although the above-mentioned
studies are concrete examples of using hardware-assisted
remote attestation, they either fail to provide details about
how to perform remote attestation in a communication
protocol or assume only the naive protocols. SPX fills this
gap in the protocol. Another approach replaces the TLS
certificate by the attestation identity key (AIK) certificate.
However, this solution is not suitable for the multi-tenant
virtualized edge-computing scenario because (i) the AIK
certificate is typically unique to one host machine, so it
is vulnerable to MITM attack; (ii) the associated costs of
assigning a TLS certificate to each edge function are high;
and (iii) high SEE overhead in decrypting the pre-master
secret and generating the attestation. In comparison, the
SPX method of binding TLS session with remote attesta-
tion on the server side addresses those concerns
13 Conclusion
This paper presented a new framework – SPX– to create
secure protocol extensions that enable edge functions to
operate on encrypted traffic, without compromising end-
to-end security properties or edge-related performance
benefits. We coined E3 security properties as equivalent to
end-to-end security properties in edge-computing scenar-
ios. We demonstrated the feasibility and performance of
SPX by prototyping it for TLS and Noise-based protocols
based on Intel SGX. In addition to providing the desired
performance and security properties, SPX addresses diffi-
cult problems such as interoperability and deployability,
to ensure that we place minimum constraints on the de-
velopers in the nascent edge-computing ecosystem.
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